The art of Trump’s Israel-Hamas deal

From ‘dead cat diplomacy’ to a ‘strangle contract’

COVER STORY | THE INDEPENDENT & AGENCIES | When Donald Trump called Benjamin Netanyahu on October 4 to tell him that Hamas had agreed to at least some of his 20-point ceasefire plan, the Israeli prime minister’s equivocal response was he saw “nothing to celebrate, and that it doesn’t mean anything”.

According to reports, writes Asaf Siniver, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham in the UK, the US president fired back: “I don’t know why you’re always so fucking negative. This is a win. Take it.”

Prof. Siniver says Trump’s visceral response is less important than the fact that it became public only hours after this private conversation. By comparison, although former U.S. president Joe Biden’s frequent excoriations of Netanyahu were well documented, they were never made public immediately after he uttered them.

Trump’s scolding of the Israeli leader, on the other hand, was intentionally leaked to publicly paint Netanyahu as the intransigent party should negotiations over ending the war collapse. Unencumbered by nuance or subtlety, Trump’s “dead cat diplomacy” in late September and early October has proven to be his single most effective leverage in bringing Israel and Hamas to the ceasefire agreement they signed on Oct.09 in Egypt.

The practice of `dead cat diplomacy’ was first articulated by former U.S. secretary of state (1989-1992) James Baker, during his incessant diplomatic efforts to coax the Syrian, Israeli and Palestinian teams to attend the historic 1991 Madrid peace conference. Despite making eight trips to the region in as many months and drawing on seemingly every resource and skill in his diplomatic toolbox, Baker was repeatedly frustrated by each party’s objections to attending the conference.

Running out of options, Baker concluded that under such circumstances, the only leverage left at his disposal was to publicly lay the blame for killing the negotiations (the metaphorical `dead cat’) at the doorstep of an intransigent negotiator.

Soon, dead cats began appearing at the metaphorical doorsteps of the key negotiators. Palestinian negotiator Hanan Ashrawi recalled that Baker’s favourite expression to egg the Arab delegations on was “Don’t let the dead cat die on your doorstep!”

After he told the Palestinians, “I am sick and tired of this. With you people, the souk (market) never closes. I’ve had it. Have a nice life,” they dropped their demands immediately.

Threatening to drop the dead cat at the doorstep of Syrian foreign minister Farouk al-Sharaa was equally effective. Baker shouted at Ashrawi over the phone, “You just tell Mr Sharaa that the whole thing is off. I’m going home. I’m taking the plane this evening and he can go back to Syria. As far as I’m concerned, it’s finished!” after which he hung up abruptly. Ashrawi delivered Baker’s threat to the Arab group.

In her 1995 memoir, `This Side of Peace’, Ashrawi recalled that “everyone was convinced that Baker was serious, and we urged the Syrians to accept an Arab compromise”.

Despite the US-Israel special relationship, Baker did not hesitate to lay equal blame for the stalled negotiations on the intransigent Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, telling him: “I’m working my ass off, and I’m getting no cooperation from you. I’m finished … I’ve got to say I’m basically disinclined to come here again.” On the way to the airport, Baker told his aide Dennis Ross: “I’m going to leave this dead cat on his doorstep”.

The cumulative effect of Baker’s dead cat diplomacy was that no party wanted to appear publicly as opposing peace. As his aide Aaron David Miller recalled: “No one wanted to be in that position.”

In his recent article, published in the scholarly online magazine, The Conversation’ on Oct.09, Prof. Asaf Siniver says, as he has written elsewhere, dead cat diplomacy is likely to be effective when three conditions are met: It must be perceived by the intransigent parties as a last-chance threat, it must be perceived as a credible move by the third party, and there must be internal factors which limit the intransigent party’s capacity to ignore the threat.

Trump plays the blame game

Notwithstanding the considerable differences in diplomatic nous between Baker and Trump, writes prof. Sinverm it is clear that at least in his negotiating an end to the two-year war between Israel and Hamas, Trump’s laying of dead cats at the Israeli and Hamas doorsteps has been perceived by both parties as last-chance, his threats credible, while he capitalised on the increasingly untenable domestic standings of Hamas and Israel.

Trump’s calling Netanyahu “always fucking negative” is but the latest dead cat laid on the Israeli leader’s doorstep. It was preceded a few days earlier by a humiliating and (public) strong-arming of Netanyahu to apologise to the Qatari prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, for Israel’s failed assassination attempt of Hamas negotiators in Doha on September 9.

As one Israeli pollster noted: “For the first time Netanyahu cannot disregard the wishes of an American president, because of the way Trump operates. Trump is unpredictable and will not fall in line with the Israeli position.”

This was perfectly illustrated by the image of Netanyahu reading out his apology from a script while Trump was resting the telephone on his lap in the Oval Office, which was a blunt – and public – rebuke of the Israeli leader: you are solely responsible for this chaos, and you’d better apologise, or else.

A few days later, Trump posted on his Truth Social account an image of the protests in Tel Aviv to end the war and against Netanyahu, showing a large banner that read: “It’s now or never.”

Such public amplifying of the voices of Netanyahu’s critics at home has left no illusions as to who Trump was blaming for the stalemate. “He was fine with it”, Trump briefed following his conversation with Netanyahu on Saturday. “He’s got to be fine with it. He has no choice. With me, you got to be fine.”

Trump has been equally expedient in laying dead cats at Hamas’s doorstep. First, by ironing out his peace plan with Israel while excluding Hamas from the process, and then by turning to his TruthSocial platform to single out Hamas as the remaining obstacle to ending the war, following his joint press conference with Netanyahu in the Oval Office.

Prof. Sinver writes: Intentionally or otherwise, this Trumpian bludgeoning contained all the hallmarks of dead cat diplomacy. It emphasises that this is a last-chance opportunity and that the threat is credible, the U.S. president having already shown his support for Israeli military action in Gaza. It also capitalises on Hamas’s increasingly isolated position, noting that it is the only party to not accept the plan and that the release of hostages held by Hamas was the difference between peace and hell in the Middle East.

Trump’s deployment of dead cat diplomacy may lack the finesse and strategic patience of Baker’s approach, but its raw, theatrical force has nonetheless reshaped the negotiating landscape. By publicly blaming Netanyahu and Hamas, isolating them diplomatically, and making clear that one of them will be remembered as the obstacle to peace, Trump has created precisely the kind of last-chance, credibility-laden pressure that dead cat diplomacy relies on to succeed.

Whether this results in a lasting peace remains uncertain. But what is clear is that Trump’s willingness to weaponise public humiliation and blame has, at least for now, jolted two entrenched adversaries closer to compromise than years of cautious mediation ever did.

What next?

One day after Israel and Hamas agreed to the first phase of a ceasefire and hostage release deal, paving the way for a possible end to the conflict in Gaza, there were jubilant scenes in both Gaza and Israel.

Marika Sosnowski, a Senior research fellow at The University of Melbourne in Australia, wrote in another article in The Conversation that if all goes well, this will be only the third ceasefire to be implemented by Israel and Hamas, despite there being numerous other agreements to try to stop the violence.

“There is a lot to be happy about here,” Marika Sosnowski wrote on Oct.10, “Most notably, this ceasefire will bring a halt to what has now been established as a genocidal campaign of violence against Palestinians in Gaza, the release of all hostages held by Hamas, and the resumption of aid into Gaza to alleviate the famine conditions there.

“However, a lot of unknowns remain. While the terms of the “first phase” of this ceasefire have been rehearsed in previous ceasefires in November 2023 and January 2025, many other terms remain vague. This makes their implementation difficult and likely contested.

He added that after the first phase is complete, a lot will depend on domestic Israeli politics and the Trump administration’s willingness to follow through on its guarantor responsibilities.

Immediate positives for both sides

According to Marika Sosnowski, the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement appears to be based on the 20-point plan U.S. President Donald Trump unveiled in the White House alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 29.

What will be implemented in what is being called the “first phase” are the practical, more detailed and immediate terms of the ceasefire.

In the text of the peace plan released to the public, these terms are stipulated in: Point 3 – an “immediate” end to the war and Israeli troop withdrawal to an “agreed upon line”. Points 4 and 5 – the release of all living and deceased hostages by Hamas in exchange for Palestinian prisoners. Point 7 – full aid to flow into the strip, consistent with the January ceasefire agreement terms.

“While these steps are positive, they are the bare minimum you would expect both sides to acquiesce to as part of a ceasefire deal,” says Sosnowski.

Sosnowski notes that over the past two years, Gaza has been virtually demolished by Israel’s military and the population of the strip is starving. There is also great domestic pressure on the Israeli government to bring the hostages home, while Hamas has no cards left to play besides their release.

“The text of these particular terms has been drafted in a way that means both Israel and Hamas know what to do and when. This makes it more likely they will abide by the terms,” says Sosnowski.

Both sides also have a vested interest in these terms happening. Further, both parties have taken these exact steps before during the November 2023 and January 2025 Gaza ceasefires.

“Given this, I expect these terms will be implemented in the coming days. It is less clear what will happen after that,” says Sosnowski.

She says after the first phase of the ceasefire has been implemented, Hamas will find itself in a situation very similar to ceasefire agreements that occurred during the Syrian civil war that began in 2011 and only recently ended with the downfall of the Assad regime in late 2024.

“I call these strangle contracts,” she says, “These type of ceasefire agreements are not like bargains or contracts negotiated between two equal parties. Instead, they are highly coercive agreements that enable the more powerful party to force the weaker party into agreeing to anything in order for them to survive.”

Sosnowski says once the hostages are released, Hamas will go back to having negligible bargaining power of its own. And the group, along with the people of Gaza themselves, will once again be at the mercy of Israeli military might and domestic and international politics.

Other terms of the Trump peace plan relating to Hamas’ demilitarisation (Points 1 and 13), the future governance of Gaza (Points 9 and 13) and Gaza’s redevelopment (Points 2, 10 and 11) are also extremely vague and offer little guidance on what exactly should occur, when or how.

“Under such a strangle contract, Hamas will have no leverage after it releases the hostages. This, together with the vague terms of the ceasefire agreement, will offer Israel a great deal of manoeuvrability and political cover,” Sosnowski says.

For example, the Israeli government could claim Hamas is not abiding by the terms of the agreement and then recommence bombardment, curtail aid or further displace the Palestinians in Gaza.

While Point 12 rightly stipulates that “no one will be forced to leave Gaza”, Israel could make conditions there so inhospitable and offer enough incentives to Gazans, they might have little choice other than to leave if they want to survive.

Points 15 and 16 stipulate that the United States (along with Arab and other international partners) will develop a temporary International Stabilisation Force to deploy to Gaza to act as guarantors for the agreement. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) will also withdraw “based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization”.

But these “standards, milestones and timeframes” have been left unspecified and will be hard for the parties to agree on.

It is also possible Israel could use the vagueness of these terms to its advantage by arguing Hamas has failed to meet certain conditions in order to justify restarting the war.

Knowing it has no leverage after the first phase, Hamas has explicitly said it is expecting the US to fulfil its guarantor role. It is certainly a good sign the U.S. has pledged 200 troops to help support and monitor the ceasefire, but at this stage, Hamas has little choice other than to pray the U.S.’ deeds reflect its words.

The American taskforce of about 200 troops is also likely to include members of the militaries of Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates, according to a senior U.S. official. No US troops will be sent into Gaza itself, said the official, who briefed the ABC and other media on condition of anonymity.

While the ceasefire was passed by a majority of the Knesset (Israel’s parliament), five far-right ministers voted against the deal. These include Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who said the ceasefire is akin to “a deal with Adolf Hitler”.

This opposition bloc will no doubt be making more threats – and could potentially act – to bring down Netanyahu’s government after the first phase is implemented.

The problem with ceasefires

The first phase of this ceasefire will offer Hamas and Israel key items – a hostage-prisoner swap, a halt to violence and humanitarian aid.

After that, rather than a bargaining process with trade-offs between negotiating partners operating on a relatively even playing field, without U.S. opprobrium, the ceasefire could easily devolve into an excuse for further Israeli domination of Gaza.

A ceasefire was always going to be a very small step forward in a long road towards peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Without meaningful engagement with Palestinians in their self-determination, we can only hope the future for Gazans will not get any worse.

As a Palestinian leader from Yarmouk camp in Syria told me back in 2018: “If there is a ceasefire, people know the devil is coming.”

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Source: The Conversation