Did Gen. Kazini try to overthrow Museveni?

When a commission of inquiry to ascertain who of the two was right or wrong was instituted, it exonerated Mutengesa and implicated Kazini.

Kazini’s abrasive style of management did not spare officers like Col. Edison Muzoora who was forced to run into exile and join rebellion because he could not work with Kazini. By the time he fled the country in 2003, he had been put on katebe for a long time.

President Museveni at some point regretted why a good officer like Muzoora could have joined rebellion. Because this and many others, during the Operation Iron Fist in 2002, Museveni ordered Kazini out of the operation and ordered his much junior colleague, Aronda Nyakairima to take up the assignment reporting directly to the president.

‘Because the man virtually conflicted with everybody in the UPDF while ascending, when his time of reckoning came everybody was baying for his blood,’ said one retired officer who preferred anonymity.

When Kazini was contacted by The Independent, he said he was not aware of a deliberate plan by his colleagues to pull him down, and that allegations that he planned to overthrow the government through 409 Brigade have not been officially communicated to him; that he has only read about them in the press.

About all these allegations; that he maliced his colleagues and pulled them down while at the helm, he dismissed them as rumours without basis.

‘I take these allegations as baseless rumours. I was not witch-hunting anybody. I did what had to be done at the right time. I was chief of staff and army commander during a war period and these are not normal times. I had to force people to do certain things to end the war. As chief of staff I had to climb mountains,’ said Maj. Gen. Kazini, adding; ‘We do not hold positions forever so when you go out you should not complain and put it on others. Even I now, am not complaining.’

He declined to discuss matters further.

However another army officer sympathetic with Kazini but who did not want to be named said as far as he knew, Kazini did not author any secret dossiers against his colleagues saying if any dossiers went sent to the president about some officers, they were intelligence reports generated through the army’s intelligence system and he had nothing to do with them, let alone knowing about them.

He singled out the issue of then Military Police commander Lt. Col. Odweyo whom intelligence reports indicated he had been trying to obtain signal codes without authority.

He said Kazini at the time was the CO of Lubiri barracks, not Odweyo’s deputy and that he [Odweyo] was court-martialled; the records are there.

He also said it was unlikely that Brig. Kamwesiga’s troubles had anything to do with Kazini given the fact that at the time the brigadier fell into trouble, he [Kazini] was away on training and had left him as CO so he could not have been part of the process that removed him. He also insisted that Kazini had a good working relationship with Gen. Odongo and if there were any disagreements, they were purely professional which perhaps is why Odongo could stand surety for him.

Regarding rapid promotions of certain officers, another officer who preferred anonymity since they are not allowed to talk to the press on army matters said these were field officers who had excelled in fighting and Kazini did not promote them personally, he only recommended them through the normal army channels.

‘In a war situation who do you favour, combatants or desk officers? These soldiers were promoted on merit,’ he asked.

Indeed, a number of Kazini’s former colleagues across the board that The Independent talked to had all praises for the beleaguered officer. ‘Kazini was extremely generous to his supporters and vicious to those who opposed him,’ said one former colleague, adding, ‘Kazini hated quislings with a passion. He hated mediocres and cowards at the frontline. That is why he was at €˜war’ with the so-called elites in the army. That is why he promoted more especially officers and men who excelled at the war fronts,’ the officer said.

Whereas pundits have been wondering and questioning if it is true that Kazini wanted to stage a coup, it now emerges that there might not have been any plan for a coup on his part. But since he is now in the mercy of people he had pulled down, the temptation to push him down is very attractive.

‘You see the current army leadership have this feeling that Kazini might bounce back. The fear is so much because almost everybody has tasted his wrath. They therefore have to do everything including handing him a life sentence such that he is done away with once and for all,’ said a source. His only known friend, Gen. Salim Saleh has these days distanced himself from him.

So how will it end for a fine fighter but seemingly divisive officer? Analysts say should his enemies succeed in jailing him, Kazini could be dismissed from the army and probably be demoted to the level of private. That would be a very dishonourable end for a valiant officer.

Allegations against Kazini

Gen. David Tinyefuza: When he was posted to Masaka as commander of the Mechanised Brigade in mid €˜90s, Kazini allegedly wrote a secret intelligence report and accused Gen. David Tinyefuza together with Col. Kizza Besigye of plotting to remove Museveni’s government; that they were training a secret militia at a ranch in Sembabule. Tinyefuza was dropped from active service and relegated to presidential adviser on security, the usual dumping and monitoring ground under President Museveni.

Lt. Col. Odweyo: That while still serving as second in command to Military Police commander Lt. Col. Odweyo, wrote a dossier accusing his boss of not being loyal to Museveni. Odweyo was arrested. He died in Luzira Prison.

Brig. Fred Kamwesiga: That while in the 1st Division then based at Lubiri in the early €˜90s, he secretly accused his then boss, the late Brig. Kamwesiga, of being a kipingamizi (saboteur) of the NRM government. Kamwesiga was subsequently removed from office and dumped on katebe. He got so disgruntled and openly began opposing Museveni. Kamwesiga got involved in the Ntungamo local politics against the army code of conduct. This further alienated Kamwesiga from the president and by the time he died on May 19, 2000, he was living a pauper’s life.

Brig. Chefe Ali: That to take up the DR Congo assignment, he [Kazini] allegedly undermined his predecessor the late Brig. Chefe Ali whom he portrayed as incompetent. By the time of his death on July 9, 1999 Chefe was living a miserable life. That Kazini who replaced him as Chief of Staff is ordered him out of his government-rented house in Rubaga and mourners were hell shocked when this bush war hero’s body was lying in his incomplete house in Nateete.

Brig. Geoffrey Muheesi: That he [Kazini] bitterly clashed with then 4th Division commander Brig. Muheesi and reportedly accused him of not being loyal to the president and that he had hundreds of ‘ghost soldiers’ under his command.

Brig. Henry Tumukunde: That Kazini clashed with Brig. Tumukunde over ghost soldiers. On several occasions the two clashed in High Command meetings.

Maj. Sabiti Mutengesa: That In July 2001, Kazini jailed the then Director of Records, Maj. Mutengesa. Mutengesa appealed to Odongo who was still army commander. Odongo, believing Mutengesa was innocent, ordered his release but to his embarrassment, Kazini defied the order and Odongo was powerless to do anything about it. Mutengesa later fled to exile in UK.

Col. Edison Muzoora: That he hounded Col. Muzoora to exile and rebellion because he could not work with Kazini. That by the time he fled the country in 2003, he had been on katebe for a long time.

Lt. Col. Dura Mawa: That Kazini appointed Lt. Col. Mawa commanding officer of the Mountain Brigade. Mawa had been Kazini’s aide de camp (ADC) when he was commanding officer of Military Police. An S.4 dropout, in 1994/05 Mawa was a lieutenant and commander of a detach at Karuma. There was an ambush there. He was taken to the court martial on accusations of robbing the victims of the ambush. When Kazini became 4th Division commander, Mawa got bail and ran to Gulu. Kazini promoted him from lieutenant, captain, major and to lieutenant colonel ‘ all in a space of four years. By 2003, Mawa was a brigadier.

Lt. Col. Freddy Segamwenge: That he promoted him from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel in just two years. By 2002, he was sector commander in Bunia, having replaced Col. Edison Muzoora. Segamwenge had a bad record both in the army and the civilian population. After the first clash in Kisangani, Kazini wrote a list of officers to be promoted. Segamwenge was then a lieutenant but Kazini reportedly presented him as a captain. During the meeting, the director of records (DOR) queried the anomaly. Kazini promoted him to captain in September 1999, major in March 2001 and then lieutenant colonel in October of the same year.

Lt. Col. Charles Okori: That Kazini propped up Lt. Col. Okori who had been his ADC in Gulu in 1997. Okori was a captain then and became lieutenant colonel by 2003.  That he even sent him on courses in Nigeria and Ghana. He appointed him to chair the inquiry into allegations that then Director of Records, Maj. Mutengesa, had created ‘ghost names’ on the army payroll.

Patrick Kiyingi: That he promoted a largely semi-literate soldier who had once been arrested for robbery of a Tata lorry in Arua, and was tried and sentenced to two years in jail. According to the army statute, once you have served a jail term exceeding six months, you are discharged with disgrace from the army. After his sentence, Kazini reinstated Kiyingi in the army.