The Independent Uganda: You get the Truth we Pay the Price
The principles to the agreement were Habyarimana’s MRND and RPF each of whom would take 40 percent of the positions in government. The other parties shared 20 percent. Within the context of Rwandan politics at the time, the main adversary of the opposition parties (largely Hutu) was Habyarimana. Because he controlled the army, the effective way to challenge Habyarimana’s power was to ally with RPF because it had the military capacity to counter him. So the MDR, PSD and PL entered an informal understanding with the RPF for cooperation.
This understanding realigned politics in Rwanda. Habyarimana realised that in the ensuing government of national unity, his party would be in a minority. On the other hand, parties like the MDR had calculated that given its Tutsi ethnic base combined with the effectiveness of the ideology of Hutu power, RPF stood no chance of winning the planned election. But if they could leverage RPF’s military power and add unto it their electoral strength, they would be able to gain and hold power.
But Habyarimana and his extremist allies saw it differently. They realised that RPF (read Tutsi) was going to capture power by allying with Hutu political parties. The understanding between RPF and the other political parties had realigned the politics in a way that created a real possibility that Tutsi could actually get into power.
Habyarimana decided on a double-pronged strategy. First, he created CDR, a Hutu extremist political party as his fifth column. It argued that Rwanda is for the Hutu only. Initially, the CDR rejected all the Arusha Accords and was actually excluded from the power sharing arrangement. But when this became clearly untenable, CDR supported by Habyarimana began demanding inclusion. The aim was to dilute the strength of RPF and its allies.
Secondly, Habyarimana fostered divisions within the other political parties causing them to split between their moderate and extremist wings. In the ensuing contest, the extremists joined Habyarimana while the moderates leaned to the RPF. These contestations caused the failure to swear-in the government of national unity on five occasions from December 1993 to April 1994 when Habyarimana was killed.
Now, under the terms of the ceasefire, the RPF had been made to withdraw from its occupied territories to its area before the May 1993 offensive. The areas from which the RPF withdrew were declared a demilitarised zone under the UN which organised local elections. Although all parties were free to participate, only the MRND and RPF fielded candidates.
RPF sent its Hutu leaders like Sendashonga, Bizimungu and Kanyarengwe to campaign on its behalf. In a surprising and shocking turn of events, RPF won all the local seats except for the top job of burgomaster which was won by MNRD. When a contingent of the RPF military was sent to Kigali as agreed in Arusha, people lined up the streets cheering its entry.
These incidents changed the strategies of the architects of Hutu power. They had succeeded in creating a widely shared social consciousness among elites and even ordinary Hutu that the Tutsi have no right to rule in Rwanda. However, it was clear that there were many intermediate factors that altered the political balance at different twists and turns that made their ideology wobbly. Short of genocide, their campaign to create a permanent wedge between Hutu and Tutsi would never succeed.
Therefore, genocide was not born of some entrenched hatred of Tutsi by Hutu. On the contrary, the background above shows it was a product of the failure of such a politics. If the architects of Hutu power were convinced that there was not a chance in hell that Hutu and Tutsi would create an alliance, they would not have sought a ‘final solution.’ Why then did masses of ordinary Hutu civilians pick machetes to kill Tutsi who were their friends, neighbours and relatives?
Many people believe that Hutu turned out en masse to kill Tutsi out of hatred. But this belief cannot stand the test of simple commonsense. Very few human beings would seek to kill people they hate. An explanation that seems powerful is FEAR. The architects of the genocide put a price on the head of any Hutu who did not participate: DEATH. So many Hutu participated in the genocide to save their own lives.
Secondly, many Hutu were told that if Tutsi came, they (Hutu) would be exterminated. So many Hutu joined the bandwagon in a perverted search for pre-emptive self defence. These subtle reasons never find expression in both the pro and anti RPF literature largely because of the complexity of the problem but also because of ignorance and prejudice.
This background explains why it has been possible for Rwanda to achieve a large measure of reconciliation. It also sheds light on why RPF has been able to consolidate itself in power. Finally and more critically, it explains why Kagame can easily win a free and fair election in Rwanda in spite of being Tutsi in a majority Hutu electorate.
amwenda@independent.co.ug
