Johnnie Carson, the Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs nof the US State Department gave this press briefing in Washington DC on March 12.This has been edited.
QN: You mentioned at the very top – you were talking about a number of recent press reports. Can you be specific about what these reports said? I’m not asking you to identify whatever organization they were responsible. But what did they say? And what is wrong – what was wrong with them? Secondly, you said that the Djibouti process was supported by IGAD, the AU, and all the countries of the region. But that’s not entirely true.
AMBASSADOR: Let me say, the most prominent article was one that appeared approximately a week ago in The New York Times, written by Jeff Gettleman, and I think co-authored by one of his colleagues, which asserted or carried the assertion that the U.S. Government had military advisors assisting and aiding the TFG, that the U.S. Government was, in fact, helping to coordinate the strategic offensive that is apparently underway now, or may be underway now, in Mogadishu, and that we were, in effect, guiding the hand and the operations of the TFG military. All of those are incorrect. All of those do not reflect the accuracy of our policy, and all of those need to be refuted very strongly. I think my statement clearly outlined what we are doing and why we are doing it.
You indicated that one state in the region has not joined in, and that is absolutely true; that is Eritrea. But Eritrea, in fact, stands alone. What my statement said was that all key states in the region, all the important states in the region – and I would include among them Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and other members of IGAD --
Does US have a position on the AU’s calls for UN peacekeepers in Somalia?
On the issue of inclusiveness, we believe that the long-term solution for Somalia’s conflict is to be found in a political reconciliation. We believe that it is important for the TFG to reach out to broaden its base as much as possible, to bring in as many clan and sub-clan groups as possible, to include among its rank other moderate Islamist groups and Somalis who were not a part of that group.
With respect to the call by the AU for a UN peacekeeping force in Somalia, I think that it is important at this point that AMISOM do the job that it has committed itself to do, that more African countries step up to participate in the AMISOM force, along with the Ugandan, Burundian, and Djiboutian troops who are already on the ground.The force was – for AMISOM was originally supposed to be 8,000 men. It is only slightly over 5,000. We hope other African nations will come forward to make contributions to the effort in Somalia.
Has the TFG requested any military assistance? Have there been any military advisors from the United States Government or any sort of covert military presence in Somalia, in Mogadishu during the past few months? Because in Mogadishu, the talk is that there is a very strong feeling that there are some sorts of military advisors from the United States Government in Mogadishu. You said, you do not want to Americanize the Somali TFG military operations. But in September 2009, we know that an operation by the United States Government killed one of the al-Qaida leaders in East Africa in Somalia. So how does these two arguments go along?
I have not, in my office, received any formal or informal request from the TFG for airstrikes or operations in support of the offensive that may be underway right now.
I will reiterate what I said in my statement: We do not have any American US military advisors on the ground assisting the TFG in its operations. It should be very clear: We do not have any American U.S. military advisors on the ground. We are not planning, coordinating any of the TFG’s military operations. It is for the TFG leadership to determine how its military operates on the ground.
Finally, the issue of Americanization of this. This is not an American conflict. The U.S., along with others in the international community, can contribute in a supporting role, which we do and acknowledge, but not to become directly engaged in any of the conflict on the ground there.
Can you just give us a dollar figure here of how much aid?
AMBASSADOR: The United States, as a member of the Contact Group and as a member of the international community, has provided something in the neighborhood of $185 million over the last 18 or 19 months.And that is in support of the AMISOM peacekeeping effort – Uganda, primarily, but Burundi and Djibouti as well. Funding going to the TFG from the United States has been substantially smaller, and that number is approximately $12 million over the last fiscal year. So the amounts of money that we are talking about are really relatively small.
You’ve spoken several times about what U.S. military assistance is not, but can you be any more specific about what U.S. military assistance to Somalia is?
AMBASSADOR: We have supported the acquisition of non-lethal equipment to the Governments of Burundi and to Uganda, in particular. We have provided them with military equipment, and this ranges every – from everything from communications gear to uniforms.
We have supported the training of TFG forces outside of Somalia, mostly in Uganda but also in Djibouti. We have paid for the transportation of the troops back from their training places abroad into the country. We have also paid for specialized training given by Ugandans to the Djiboutians to deal with such things as improvised explosive devices, training for the protection of ports and airports. But this has been done by the Ugandans, not by any U.S. Government military officials.
You keep reading that the transitional government, like, controls a matter of blocks in Mogadishu, that it’s very weak, it’s very threatened. What is your take on its survivability?
AMBASSADOR: I think the TFG has demonstrated in an enormous capacity to survive. When Sheikh Sharif took office as the head of the TFG approximately 16 months ago, there were individuals who predicted that his government would fall within a matter of months and that he would not be able to reside and govern from Mogadishu. The fact that the TFG remains standing is a reflection of its resolve and the commitment of its leaders to stand up against al-Shabaab. There is no doubt that the TFG is still fighting very hard to regain control over most of Mogadishu. Reports that it controls only three, four, or five city blocks are erroneous. What the TFG does control is the main port of Mogadishu, the two main airports, and all of the central government buildings. It has clear control over a third of the city.
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